ICELANDIC FISHERIES GOVERNANCE - A THIRD WORLD UNDERSTANDING By John Kurien

Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3061
In recent years the term ‘governance’
has come into increased currency. The
Commission on Global Governance
defined governance simply as “the sum of
the many ways individuals and institutions,
public and private, manage their
common affairs.” The World Humanity
Action Trust (WHAT) defines governance
as “the systematic framework of social,
economic, legal and political structures
within which humanity chooses and/or
accepts to manage its affairs”. Until a few
decades ago “the sum of the many ways”
and the “systematic framework” were
largely defined within the formal structures
and capacity of nation states. It was
therefore bounded within the concept of
national sovereignty, the idea that the
government of a state recognises no external
authority and that its rule is supreme
within its national boundaries.
The situation has changed today. While
nation states remain powerful, the authority
and power of intergovernmental
organisations, international non-government
organisations and the global market
have increased enormously. This has contributed
to the development of a much
more complex situation with regard to the
range as well as the level of choices open
to humanity to manage its affairs. Governance
can be without government. Governance
can take place at different levels, both
above and below the confines of nation
states. These levels can interact and create
reciprocal influences that come to have
strong bearings on the social, economic,
legal and political choices before people
in society. This is a dynamic process. It
is also specific to a particular context.
In this brief paper, we attempt to give
a picture of the changing scenario of
governance in Icelandic fishery, viewed
from the perspective of a third world
observer. By commencing with a detailed
history, we make an effort to highlight how
individuals and social groups exercised
choices and initiated actions that widened
the interest in fishery. It moved from being
an occupational choice for the livelihood
of farm labourers in isolated coastal communities
to become a rallying ‘nationalist’
concern for the people of Iceland as a
whole. This has naturally created changing
realms of governance. They have both
influenced, and been affected by, legally
binding international agreements and the
growth of the international market. The
compulsions of the present have been
conditioned by the past and hold questions
for the future.
Iceland, that little island nation, which
hangs from the Arctic Circle, has earned
a place for itself in the realm of global
fisheries. Here is a poor European nation
which was settled for the last 1100 years
that became wealthy not by colonial exploits
or industrial transformation, but
rather through the vigorous and nationalistic
pursuit of developing its fisheries.
Today, fisheries are responsible for some
75 per cent of Iceland’s total revenues
from goods exported (around 5 per cent
of the world’s total fishing exports) and
yield 55 per cent of all national foreign
currency earnings. In 1995, Iceland exported
marine products valued at ISK 90
billion (USD 1.3 billion) from a total catch
of over one million tonnes. Annual catches
in recent years have averaged around 1.5
million tonnes, but the volume depends
very much on catches of pelagic species,
especially capelin, which have fluctuated
widely from one year to the next. In terms
of catch volume, Iceland ranks 14th among
the world’s leading fishing nations. Some
15,000 people in Iceland – 11 per cent of
the total national workforce – work directly
in fishing or fish processing, if this
employment sector is defined in the traditional
manner. In fact, this is a very low
proportion compared with the importance
of the sector for the entire Icelandic
economy.
Early History
The process of fisheries development
can be said to have begun about 700 years
ago in the early 14th century when
Hanseatic merchants based in Bergen began
to import dried cod fish from Iceland. This
linkage in itself was not accidental. The
first Viking settlers to Iceland came from
this part of western Norway. This trade
attracted the English merchants who,
shortly after 1400, began sailing to Iceland
in search of dry cod. Later they financed
English fishing interests to catch cod off
the coasts of Iceland and also bought it
from the local Icelandic fishermen.
The Danish crown, which ruled Iceland
at that time, frowned upon this contact.
However, Denmark lacked the necessary
naval power to block the English trade. In
fact, clashes between England and Denmark
during mid-15th century can be traced
to the killing of a Danish governor who
tried to stop both English trade with Iceland
and English fishing in Iceland’s coastal
waters. These tensions continued until the
early 16th century after which English
interests in Iceland waned with the discovery
of rich fishing grounds off the North
American coast of Newfoundland.
The French and Germans took the space
vacated by the English only to be ousted
in the early 17th century (1602) by the
Danish crown which monopolised all
Icelandic Fisheries Governance
A Third World Understanding
Today Icelandic fisheries are the most productive in the world. The country’s historic
efforts at gaining sovereignty over its fishery resources and the governance structures it has
instituted highlights the need to move from an open access regime, with possession rights
only, to a regime of explicitly recognised property rights. Recent attempts at conservation
of fishery resources through privatisation has led to dominance of foreign firms
threatening the country’s fishery sovereignty.
JOHN KURIEN
3062 Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
foreign trade by royal decree. This trade
monopoly remained for nearly 250 years
(until 1855) and could be enforced due to
the absolute monarchy enforced over
Iceland by the Danish king.
The coastal fishery in Iceland developed
significantly during the 17th and 18th
centuries. The main occupation of most of
the inhabitants was farming. But the
labourers who worked in the southern and
western regions were permitted to go fishing
in the late winter and spring when landbased
activity was at a low ebb. However,
the labourers were required to stay in the
domestic service of a farmer, and the
establishment of permanent households in
fishing stations was restricted. Thus the
landowners, in collaboration with church
functionaries and officials, monopolised
the fishing. These restrictions preempted
it from developing into an independent
industry.
This situation continued into the mid-
18th century (1784) when famine, as a
result of damage to pastures and animals
caused by a major volcanic eruption, killed
one-fifth of the population. The situation
was so bad that the Danish king even
considered the possibility of the evacuation
of the whole island. This natural
calamity, coupled with the exploits of an
adventuresome Dane who tried to capture
power in Iceland in the early 19th century,
made for a gradual weakening of the
colonial hold over Iceland. The power of
the richer farmers who employed several
farmhands declined considerably. This
gave rise to an increase of ‘unattached’
landless people. Poverty increased and
people were faced with the choice of leaving
agriculture or leaving Iceland. During this
period (1870 to 1914) over 15,000 people
migrated to Canada.
Capitalist Development
The Danish trade monopolies were rapidly
relaxed in the late 19th century and
local accumulation became possible. An
Icelandic merchant class gradually emerged
and played a significant role in investing
in the fisheries. Icelandic salted cod began
to develop new markets abroad as a result
of its quality. This was based on a method
originally developed by the Basque people.
Soon the all-important Spanish market,
which was dominated by the Norwegians,
was totally in the hands of Iceland. The
pope also helped the Lutheran Icelanders
in their fish exports. This he did inadvertently
by making salted fish the main item
on the menu during the many days that
meat was not to be consumed by Catholics
in Europe.
For the landless peasants, who remained
in Iceland, fishing gradually became an
important alternative. This gave rise to the
gradual creation of independent fishing
settlements along the coast. The petty
entrepreneur, the fishing peasant, the
skipper-owner and the merchant company
were examples of the different forms of
production that gradually emerged over
the next century. All this happened during
the struggle for Icelandic independence. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that
the gradual emergence of capitalist development
in fishery aided in the political
transformation of Iceland. The introduction
of the decked fishing vessels in the
end of the 19th century made it possible
to catch fish farther offshore than could
be done on open fishing boats. The official
declaration of a fishing limit with an
exclusive zone of three nautical miles in
1901 gave legal sanction to this process
of expansion.
Iceland got home rule in 1904. The
technological progress in fishing after that
was considerable. Motors were installed
in many of the open fishing boats and a
number of steam-driven trawlers were
acquired. Initially the large merchants
owned a substantial part of the fleet. The
productivity of fishing increased greatly,
and agriculture became relatively less
attractive as a source of subsistence to the
peasantry. All restrictions on the freedom
to move to the fishing villages were either
abolished or quietly forgotten and fishing
became a full-time occupation. The infrastructure
such as harbours, wharves and
processing facilities were set up in the
fjords by the merchants. They hired
labourers from the new coastal settlements
to work on their boats and at the processing
facilities. This provided jobs for several
hundreds during the winter months. Gradually
the number of small skipper-owners
and petty entrepreneurs increased. The
merchants who provided credit so that the
processing facilities would receive adequate
supplies of fish facilitated this.
The skipper-owners and the petty entrepreneurs
utilised their family resources of
capital and labour. As capital was scarce,
and labour availability depended on both
the sex compositions of the household and
its stage in the family development cycle,
not all skipper-owners or petty entrepreneurs
were successful. Those who had
sons of the appropriate ages could expand
their activities and gradually enlarge their
enterprise and even form a company with
family members as shareholders. Family
and private firms in the harvesting and
processing of fish became a common
organisational arrangement alongside the
peasant fishing economy. It would seem
that the control exercised by these large
family firms on the fish economy of
Iceland was considerable.
In 1911 the Fisheries Association of
Iceland was formed. This seems very much
in keeping with the country’s democratic
tradition as well as the tradition of keeping
good records. It was an organisation with
representational membership from all the
interest groups and regions of the country.
It established the tradition of calling an
annual meeting called a ‘Fiskithing’ (fisheries
congress) which became a forum to
discuss matters of concern to the fisheries.
It played a lead role in training and education
of people employed with the fisheries
and later helped in founding the
Icelandic Fisheries Laboratories and the
Marine Research Institute. The multi-stakeholder
and multi-regional character of the
Fisheries Association of Iceland gave the
industry a fair degree of openness of
operation and provided the basis for a good
form of participation by the ‘interested
public’ in the governance of the fishery.
The radical transformation of the occupational
structure and the development of
the capitalist forms of work organisation
led to the advent of both a labour movement
and a cooperative movement. This
needs to be situated against the background
of the boom in fish exports during the first
world war. In 1916 a national organisation
of trade unions was established though it
was legalised only in 1938. The merchant
owners of fishing companies had to conform
to the formal demands of labour
unions both of crew on the boats and the
workers in the processing plants.
Women came to play an important role
in the fishery. In the production process
they were involved in the making and
mending of nets and baiting of hooks.
Their role was also indispensable in the
other preparations needed to get a fishing
trip going. In the processing operations
their role was more direct and crucial, first
in the salting and drying and later in the
freezing plants. The invisible component
of women’s work – running the household
and raising the children – was also particularly
high and taxing in the homes of
fishermen who were away at sea for long
on the larger boats. Women’s franchise
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3063
rights and the early right to attend schools
of higher education provided opportunities
to move out of the conventional
roles and jobs. It also helped to foster a
nascent women’s movement in which
many from coastal communities were involved.
Unlike in many other developed
maritime countries, the organised involvement
of women in fishery is another of
the unique features of Iceland’s fish
economy. Both at the workplace and the
home, women seem to have benefited from
the rising productivity of the sector in this
time period.
The growth of labour rights, the expansion
of capitalist enterprise and the success
of fishery further fuelled the struggle for
independence. In December 1918 Iceland
became a state under the Danish crown.
Either party to the agreement could terminate
the treaty after 25 years if negotiations
about its renewal proved fruitless. Following
this, a new system of political parties
based on class divisions emerged and class
antagonism grew. The great depression
increased class tensions and the outbreak
of the Spanish civil war in 1936 closed the
important Spanish market for Icelandic
salt fish. This created a period of high
unemployment in fishery. The fishery
capitalists formed the union of Icelandic
fish producers (SIF) to gain better control
over the processing and marketing of salt
fish products. Iceland also acquired its first
coast guard vessel in 1920 since it was
highly dissatisfied with the way the Danish
navy administered the then three-mile
fishing zone, especially in the case of British
trawlers, which often fished as close to
land as they could reach.
When the second world war broke out,
the German occupation of Denmark and
the British occupation of Iceland put a cap
on the union between Iceland and the
Danish crown. Before the war, foreigners
were responsible for two-thirds of the
demersal fish catch in Icelandic waters.
The demand for Icelandic fish skyrocketed
during the war. Catches made by Icelandic
vessels increased since foreign vessels were
busy in pursuit of things other than fish.
The US took over the defence of Iceland
and stationed a force of 60,000 in a country,
which at that time had a population
of 120,000. This brought employment and
prosperity to the economy and coastal
fishery benefited greatly. In 1944 the
Icelanders decided to terminate the treaty
with Denmark and the Icelandic Republic
was formed on June 17, 1944 at Thingvellir,
the original seat of the Althing. Severing
ties with Denmark also meant taking full
charge of their fishing policies.
Independence
Independence came at the time of the
second world war. The post-war period
saw the rapid expansion of the trawler
fleet. Fish freezing became a highly technical
industry and the mainstay of Icelandic
fishery exports to Europe. There was
a phase of overexpansion, full employment,
and high inflation. The lack of a
strong political leadership marked the postwar
period. Political coalitions were the
norm in the Althing (parliament). Broadly,
they could be characterised as the ‘nationalistic’
group composed of the left-wing
parties and the ‘pro-western’ group composed
of the agrarian and the social democratic
parties. Their politics came to
flashpoints on two recurrent issues of postwar
politics: defence (on the question of
joining NATO) and fishing limits (on the
question of extending the limits of the
territorial fishing zone).
The overwhelming dependence of the
country on fisheries for its livelihood and
economic development highlighted the
need to take more proactive steps to protect
fishing grounds and ensure effective
governance over them. Following the
Truman proclamation of 1945, several Latin
American countries such as Mexico,
Argentina and Chile began claiming
national sovereignty over water covering
the continental shelf. Iceland followed
closely by enacting a law in April 1958
concerning the scientific conservation of
continental shelf fisheries. The first article
of the law reads as follows:
The ministry of fisheries shall issue regulations
establishing explicitly bounded
conservation zones within limits of the
continental shelf of Iceland, wherein all
fisheries shall be subject to Icelandic rules
and control: provided that the conservation
measures now in effect shall in no way
be reduced. The ministry shall further issue
the necessary regulations for the protection
of fishing grounds within said zones...
The regulations shall be revised in the light
of scientific research.
In May 1958, following the failure of
UNCLOS I to reach an agreement on the
extension of the fishing zone beyond the
territorial sea of 3 nautical miles, Iceland
unilaterally extended its fishing zone to 12
nautical miles in September 1958. It then
gave notice to the British trawlers still
fishing up to four miles off Iceland to
withdraw. When they did not, Icelandic
gunboats arrested two of the trawlers. In
response a British frigate and destroyer
dashed in to recapture them. This led to
the beginning of the famous ‘cod wars’.
The British Navy repeatedly sent their
gunboats to the Icelandic fishing grounds
to protect British trawlers. The Icelandic
coast guard was puny compared to the
might of the British navy. Yet they prevailed
because of their approach, in later
encounters, of perfecting the art of cutting
the trawl ropes of the British trawlers rather
than confronting their navy vessels. This
strategy paid off. British trawlers gradually
withdrew thereby increasing the stocks
under Iceland’s exclusive control.
The success of this approach resulted in
Iceland joining company with many developing
Asian countries during UNCLOS II
in 1960. Together they argued for the
concept of ‘preferential rights’ in matters
of fisheries jurisdiction in special cases of
‘overwhelming dependence’ of the coastal
state upon fisheries resources in the adjacent
sea for its livelihood and economic
development. The relevant portion of the
Icelandic proposal stated that:
Where a people is overwhelmingly dependent
upon its coastal fisheries for its livelihood
or economic development and it
becomes necessary to limit the total catch
of a stock or stocks of fish in areas adjacent
to the coastal fisheries zone, the
coastal state shall have preferential rights
under such limitations to the extent rendered
necessary by its dependence upon
the fishery.
UNCLOS II failed to reach any agreement
on extended territorial zones. This
led Iceland to further extend its fishing
zone to 50 nautical miles in 1972, and
finally to 200 nautical miles in 1976 while
UNCLOS III negotiations were still on.
This they did by amending their 1958 law
concerning the scientific conservation of
continental shelf fisheries.
Governance
The role of government in Iceland’s
fisheries can be summarised as (1) setting
the rules concerning fishing, and (2) providing
the sector with an optimal operating
environment. The ministry of fisheries is
responsible for the governance of fisheries
in Iceland and the implementation of legislation,
and issue regulation to this effect.
Its duties are general administration, longterm
planning and relations with other
fisheries institutions at the international
level. The ministry is assisted in these tasks
by three bodies: the directorate of fisher3064
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
ies, the marine research institute and the
icelandic fisheries laboratories. In 1998
the ministry of fisheries had a staff of 17
and a budget of US $ 3 million.
There are other ministries and agencies
that assist in the process of governance.
The ministry of justice administers the
Icelandic coast guard. The ministry of
communications administers the directorate
of shipping and the port and lighthouse
authority. The ministry of foreign
affairs administers the matters relating to
trade and exports as well as international
agreements.
The directorate of fisheries undertakes
the day-to-day administration of the fisheries.
It is responsible for applying legislation
on fisheries management, including
supervision of processing and handling of
fish products. It collects and publishes data
and other fisheries statistics. It authorises
fishing by issuing fishing permits to vessels.
It also issues the quotas to these
vessels and supervises the transfer of quotas
and controls the reporting of data on the
landings of vessels and monitors the
weighing-in of catches. To be able to
coordinate this for the whole country the
directorate works in collaboration with the
harbour authorities and the association of
local authorities.
The directorate provides on-board and
port supervision of vessels to inspect catch
composition, equipment used and fish
handling methods. The Icelandic coast
guard and the directorates of customs and
shipping collaborate to fulfil this mission.
The directorate issues licences to processing
plants and ensures that they keep to
the quality and hygiene standards. This is
undertaken by commissioning inspection
bodies. They in turn conduct on-board and
land-based inspection in accordance to
norms developed. The directorate approves
these inspection bodies and supervises their
operations. It also inspects processors on
an intermittent basis to verify that official
requirements are being complied with. In
1998 the directorate had a regular staff of
59 and operated on a budget of US $ 5
million of which half is covered by
licencing and other fees.
There is one important point that we
must keep in mind. The campaign for
control of territorial waters was both the
campaign of the Icelanders for priority in
exploiting the natural resources surrounding
their country, and at the same time a
campaign to achieve responsible exploitation
of the fish stocks at the level of the
individual fishing unit. Icelanders had
argued that competition among fishermen
from different nations pursuing different
goals with respect to the quantity and
quality of fish brought ashore could lead
to inefficient use of the resource. Foreigners
would be concerned about balancing
the cost and revenue for each given trip,
whereas natives would take future catches
into account in deciding what to fish and
when to do it. The mood in Iceland had
been – get rid of foreigners so that we can
manage the resource in a responsible
manner.
With the progressive extension of the
exclusive fishing zone (to 12, 50 and then
200 miles) the fishery resource therein
became the state property of Iceland.
However, coastal fishery was for all practical
purposes an open access realm for the
people of Iceland within the larger rubric
of state property. Anyone could invest in
a boat, obtain a licence and go fishing from
anywhere in the island.
This resulted in increasingly excessive
fishing capital and effort compared to the
reproductive capacity of the fish stocks.
It is estimated that between 1945 and 1983,
fisheries capital increased by well over
1,200 per cent and real catches by 300 per
cent. This long-term decline in the economic
performance of Icelandic fisheries
did not go unnoticed by the fisheries
authorities. It also probably got reflected
at the local level by increasing losses at
the level of the fishing units. The move
towards creating a consensus for change
in the property rights structure and the
nature of governance of fisheries at the
local level required a process of consensus
building at the popular level. No change
in this could be made by administrative
fiat. As it involved major wealth distribution
implications, there had to be a political
consensus on these matters. Given the
centrality of fisheries in the economy and
the democratic culture of Iceland, this was
a daunting task.
ITQs
The initial efforts to introduce mechanisms
of governance at the local level were
to apply effort limitations that focused on
limiting the number of vessels and fishing
days. This did not yield the desired results.
The situation of individuals assuming
management and self-governance responsibility
without a well-defined structure of
rights seemed to be at the root of the failure
of these efforts. To overcome this, Iceland
broke new ground in the area of fisheries
management and governance by allocating
property rights to the resources at the level
of the individual units. This can be viewed
as transference of the rights achieved by
the nation to the individual stakeholders
who had a direct interest in fishery.
These property rights took the form of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). ITQs
are property rights to the fishery resources
that are transferable and divisible at the
discretion of the individuals, but subject
to some overall norms. The assumption
implicit in this approach is that individual
rights to property will aggregate to yield
enlightened governance of that property
by the individuals to whom the rights are
allocated.
The build-up to the decision for this
change was multi-pronged and took over
a decade. In 1975 the marine research
institute issued a report on the status of
the Icelandic cod stocks. The report, nicknamed
‘The Black Report’ pronounced
that the Icelandic cod stocks would soon
collapse if fishing was continued at the
same level of effort. Several weeks later
a working committee of the governmental
science and research council published
another report titled ‘Development of
Marine Fisheries’. This was later nicknamed
‘The Blue Report’. It merely restated
the existence of the “problem of the
commons” in marine fisheries even if all
the fishermen were of the same nationality.
This report concluded that the fishery
management methods in use at the time
were aimed at guarding the interests of
occupationally or geographically defined
groups in Iceland, but had no roots in the
biological sciences or economics. The
belief that extending national jurisdiction
would automatically lead to sustainable
fishing was therefore beginning to be
questioned. This created considerable
public opinion about the crisis in the fishery
– both its biological and economic
aspects. It was not only the scientists and
policy-makers who addressed the issues,
parliamentarians and community leaders
were involved in the process.
The Fiskithing deliberated over this
contentious issue for over a year and
finally in their annual congress in December
1983 they decided to support the
government’s moves to introduce an ITQ
system on a temporary basis for one year.
The government in power at that time (a
right wing coalition) moved cautiously.
Before the year was over the parliament
passed an amendment to the fisheries act
of 1976 giving the minister of fisheries
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3065
discretionary power to put a vessel quota
system in place. In the upper house of the
parliament, the amendment received only
the minimum majority necessary of 11 of
20 MPs in support. To ensure sufficient
support for the system a very important
provision was added. Vessels below 10
GRT were allowed to opt out of the catch
quota and abide by earlier effort restrictions
instead. This dual system of local
level fishery governance continued between
1984 and 1987. In January 1988 the parliament
enacted a general-vessel quota legislation
to cover all demersal fisheries and
made the effort option less attractive. In
1990 a more comprehensive legislation,
the fisheries management act, was passed.
Only vessels below 6 GRT were exempt
from the ITQ system. All vessels had to
be licensed and a moratorium was put on
issuing new licences. The ITQ system was
extended indefinitely.
The system operates in the following
manner: Every fishing vessel with a commercial
fishing permit is allocated a permanent
‘quota share’ mainly on the basis
of its catches from 1981-83. This quota
share is a percentage of the total allowable
catch (TAC) of all regulated species. The
allotted catch of each vessel therefore
changes from year to year depending on
the TAC for the species in question. The
success of the ITQ system depends
crucially on the information governance
capability of the system. Every fish landing
has to be recorded and instantly collated
to ensure that quotas are not busted.
The municipalities operate the weightstations
and they collect fees from the
vessels to cover operating costs. The information
is then put on the web page of
the directorate and in print on a monthly
basis. Catch status can be ascertained over
the phone.
Annual quotas may be sold for an individual
fishing year, but such transactions
are subject to certain limitations to prevent
sudden disruption. From 1998 onwards,
such transactions have to be transacted
only through a ‘Kvotabanki’ (quota bank).
Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth
in the sales of both permanent quota shares
and annual quotas and the quotas themselves
have attained a very big premium
in the market. From the starting position
in 1983, the ITQs have got concentrated in
the hands of a few fishing units. This process
of concentration can be viewed from
two perspectives. It can be seen as either
increasing the efficiency and stability of
the sector or as the growing marginalisation
of those whose strength in the market is
limited or non-existent. The current debate
in Iceland on the merits and demerits of
ITQs are drawn along these lines.
Questions for the Future
Who are the ultimate owners of the fishery
resource? The issue of the privatisation of
the access to the resource has become a
contentious issue in Iceland itself. The
small boat owner’s association that represents
an important segment of the fishery
from a political perspective, if nothing
else, has questioned this approach. Their
main contention is that ITQs have not led
to resource conservation. They point out
that the TACs for the important species
like cod have in fact reached their all time
low levels in the 1990s – almost a decade
after privatisation of fishing rights.
Even in the industry there is some divergence
of views on this matter. This is
particularly so in the face of trends like
greater on-board processing resulting in
loss of land-based jobs. There is also the
threat of communities losing jobs as a
result of the sale of ITQs by the firms or
individuals holding them to buyers from
other regions.
The matter has also been debated in the
supreme court of Iceland on the basis of
a case filed by an ‘ordinary citizen’ of the
country. The supreme court examined the
case by considering two constitutional
articles (Art 65 and 75) which give equal
rights for all citizens and freedom to choose
employment respectively. It also considered
Article 1 of the fisheries management
law, which makes clear that the fish resources
within the EEZ are public property.
Taking these three aspects together
the court ruled that the allocation of fishing
quotas to operative vessels according to
catch history (in 1984) was a reasonable
reaction to the resource situation at that
time. However, it ruled that converting this
to permanent rights, thus giving great,
permanent privileges to the owners of
operative vessels in 1984 cannot be justified
by any public interest and was therefore
unconstitutional. The judgment raised
the issue of who is the ultimate owner of
the fishery resources of Iceland – the public
or the ITQ holder?
Will national governance be undermined?
The most recent issue is the implication
of the foreign ownership of the
big fishery firms that hold a considerable
share of the total quota holdings. There is
considerable anxiety about the growing
concentration of the ITQs in the hands of
these few companies. The social justice
and distributional implications apart, there
is a moot question of the loss of national
control over resources. Many of the large
private companies are going public. This
action is helping them to argue that the
effective control of the companies is in the
hand of the many hundreds of shareholders
that are ordinary Icelanders. However, the
fact of the matter is that this accounts only
for a minor part of the shares. The original
owners and their subsidiary companies
still closely hold the majority shares.
Moreover, the overall quota holdings of
the 10 largest private firms increased from
25 per cent in 1991-92 to 38 per cent in
1998-99. In the context of the growing
globalisation of the fishing industry of
Iceland there is a legitimate concern that
these companies will increasingly be internationally
controlled. This can, in the long
run, give rise to a serious contradiction in
the governance and rights structures. While
the resources of the EEZ will belong to
the Icelandic republic and be governed by
national laws, the effective property rights
to the resource at the local level of the
fishing company can be very much in the
hands of foreign capital. Will national
governance be undermined from below?
Are ITQs appropriate for developing
countries? From our review of the history
we notice that Iceland had taken a lead role
in the UNCLOS to argue for the rights of
national governance of coastal waters,
particularly in cases where countries have
a greater level of dependence on fishery
for livelihood and food. This was a position
that was wholeheartedly supported by
the developing countries. Today we see
that there is a new enthusiasm on the part
of Iceland, particularly its fishery economists,
to propagate the use of private
property rights to the fishery as the sine
qua non for fisheries management to be
effective. The appropriateness of this
approach for developing countries needs
to be assessed cautiously.
In this context it is necessary to state the
assumptions behind the ITQ system and
examine if these are appropriate to the
context of developing countries. Firstly
there is the theoretical assumption that it
costs nothing to enforce the ITQ system
or at the least that the benefits will far
outweigh the costs. It is presumed that
fishery managers will be able to allot quotas
and decide the yearly TAC without interference
from the different interest groups
in the fishery – the boat owners, the pro3066
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
cessing plant owners, the local communities,
the environmentalists and other stakeholders.
Secondly, it is usually assumed
that individuals and fishing firms do not
try to cheat and harvest more than the
allotted quota. Thirdly, fishing firms are
explicitly supposed to be atomistic profitmaximisers
without any political leverage
to gain subsidisation of key inputs. It is
doubtful if these assumptions are valid
even in Iceland today and therefore
question the true efficiency of the ITQ
system in the context of real political
economy. How then is it valid for developing
countries?
Concluding Thoughts
Iceland is a unique country. As the tourist
literature announces, it is ‘Europe’s Best
Kept Secret’. The opportunity to learn about
this country, its people and its economy
are not everyday happenings. Fisheries
constitute the most important sector of the
economy and fish a central part of the diet
and culture. Iceland’s historic efforts at
gaining sovereignty over its fishery resources
have been a great source of inspiration
to developing nations in instituting
national governance structures which
played an important role in influencing the
course of the UNCLOS I, II and III discussions.
Today Iceland’s fisheries are the
most productive in the world at approximately
280 tonnes per fisherman per annum
compared to between 2 and 5 tonnes for
most developing countries. This huge
difference reflects the greater people-dominance
of the fisheries sectors of the latter
rather than the resource plenitude of the
former. The Icelandic fishery sector experience
at governance highlights the need
to move from an open access regime (with
possession rights only) to a regime of
explicitly recognised property rights.
However, property rights can take numerous
forms and the Icelandic experience of
local-level governance using private property
rights with instruments such as ITQs
may not provide a model for the third
world to follow. Subject to this caveat, the
Icelandic system of governance highlights
the potentials for making fishery the
‘engine of growth of the economy’ of a
very small nation with large fishery resources.
The ‘governance success’ of
privatisation also throws up larger issues.
The role of the ‘people of a nation’ as
stakeholders in the stewardship of
natural resources is the most important.
In the context of globalisation, and the
growing international integration of national
economies into a global system, true
national sovereignty over natural resources
can be in jeopardy. There is a need to
explicitly recognise the implications of
these factors.
[A visit to Iceland to have a first hand appreciation
of Icelandic fisheries would not have been possible
without the generous and gracious support extended
to me by the World Humanity Action Trust,
(WHAT), UK. This brief analysis and thoughts
about the governance issues in Icelandic fisheries
are based on my discussions between August 17
and 23, 1999 with numerous persons who have
a firsthand understanding of the history and state
of affairs. I would like to thank Rognvaldur
Hannesson for taking me around Iceland showing
me nature in its variety of forms – hot and cold
– and glimpses into the culture and history of the
people. This was a truly unique once-in-a-lifetime
experience. I must also place on record my sincere
gratitude to Thorolfur Matthiasson, Birgir
Runolfsson, Arthur Bogason, Orn Palsson, Jon
Thordarson, Kristjan Thorarinsson, Petur
Bjarnason, Egill Jonasson, and Gisli Palsson for
sharing with me their thoughts and writings, which
I have used liberally in this brief note. My thanks
also to Rognvaldur Hannesson and Grimur
Valdimarsson for comments on a first draft. It is
quite likely that there are errors and omissions,
the responsibility for that rests solely on my
shoulders.]
References
Bjarnason P (1999): ‘The Fisheries Association
of Iceland’ (manuscript).
Bjorgulfsdottir M (1999): ‘Scrumtious Saltfish as
a Source of Life’, Atlantica, July-August 1999,
Reykjavik.
Bogason A (1998): ‘Crossing Boundaries’
(manuscript), paper presented at Vancouver,
June.
Extavour WC (1979): ‘The Exclusive Economic
Zone: A Study of the Evolution and Progressive
Development of the International Law of the
Sea’, IUHEI, Geneva.
Fiskifelag Islands (1998): Utvegur 1997.
Hagstofa Islands (1998): Landshagir, Statistical
Yearbook of Iceland 1998, Reykjavik.
Kurien J (1998): Property Rights, Resource
Management and Governance: Crafting
an Institutional Framework for Global
Marine Fisheries, CDS/SIFFS Publications,
Trivandrum.
Matthiason T (1997): ‘Consequences of Local
Government Involvement in the Icelandic
ITQ Market’, Marine Resource Economics,
pp 107-126.
– (nd):‘The Icelandic Debate on Fishery
Management and Resource Rent Distribution’
(manuscript).
Ministry of Fisheries (1998): Close to the Sea,
Reykjavik.
National Academy of Sciences (1999): ‘The
Icelandic Individual Transferable Quota
Program’, in Sharing the Fish: Towards a
National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas,
Washington DC.
Nordal J and Kristinsson V (1996): ‘Fishing
Industry’ in Iceland, The Republic, Central
Bank of Iceland Publication, Reykjavik.
Runolfsson B (1999): ‘ ITQs in Icelandic Fisheries:
A Rights Based Approach to Fisheries
Management’, paper presented in Workshop on
Use Rights in European Fisheries, May, Brest.
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1994):
(15th Ed) Macropaedia, Vol 20, Iceland,
pp 760-767, Chicago.
EPW
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ICELANDIC FISHERIES GOVERNANCE - A THIRD WORLD UNDERSTANDING By John Kurien

Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3061
In recent years the term ‘governance’
has come into increased currency. The
Commission on Global Governance
defined governance simply as “the sum of
the many ways individuals and institutions,
public and private, manage their
common affairs.” The World Humanity
Action Trust (WHAT) defines governance
as “the systematic framework of social,
economic, legal and political structures
within which humanity chooses and/or
accepts to manage its affairs”. Until a few
decades ago “the sum of the many ways”
and the “systematic framework” were
largely defined within the formal structures
and capacity of nation states. It was
therefore bounded within the concept of
national sovereignty, the idea that the
government of a state recognises no external
authority and that its rule is supreme
within its national boundaries.
The situation has changed today. While
nation states remain powerful, the authority
and power of intergovernmental
organisations, international non-government
organisations and the global market
have increased enormously. This has contributed
to the development of a much
more complex situation with regard to the
range as well as the level of choices open
to humanity to manage its affairs. Governance
can be without government. Governance
can take place at different levels, both
above and below the confines of nation
states. These levels can interact and create
reciprocal influences that come to have
strong bearings on the social, economic,
legal and political choices before people
in society. This is a dynamic process. It
is also specific to a particular context.
In this brief paper, we attempt to give
a picture of the changing scenario of
governance in Icelandic fishery, viewed
from the perspective of a third world
observer. By commencing with a detailed
history, we make an effort to highlight how
individuals and social groups exercised
choices and initiated actions that widened
the interest in fishery. It moved from being
an occupational choice for the livelihood
of farm labourers in isolated coastal communities
to become a rallying ‘nationalist’
concern for the people of Iceland as a
whole. This has naturally created changing
realms of governance. They have both
influenced, and been affected by, legally
binding international agreements and the
growth of the international market. The
compulsions of the present have been
conditioned by the past and hold questions
for the future.
Iceland, that little island nation, which
hangs from the Arctic Circle, has earned
a place for itself in the realm of global
fisheries. Here is a poor European nation
which was settled for the last 1100 years
that became wealthy not by colonial exploits
or industrial transformation, but
rather through the vigorous and nationalistic
pursuit of developing its fisheries.
Today, fisheries are responsible for some
75 per cent of Iceland’s total revenues
from goods exported (around 5 per cent
of the world’s total fishing exports) and
yield 55 per cent of all national foreign
currency earnings. In 1995, Iceland exported
marine products valued at ISK 90
billion (USD 1.3 billion) from a total catch
of over one million tonnes. Annual catches
in recent years have averaged around 1.5
million tonnes, but the volume depends
very much on catches of pelagic species,
especially capelin, which have fluctuated
widely from one year to the next. In terms
of catch volume, Iceland ranks 14th among
the world’s leading fishing nations. Some
15,000 people in Iceland – 11 per cent of
the total national workforce – work directly
in fishing or fish processing, if this
employment sector is defined in the traditional
manner. In fact, this is a very low
proportion compared with the importance
of the sector for the entire Icelandic
economy.
Early History
The process of fisheries development
can be said to have begun about 700 years
ago in the early 14th century when
Hanseatic merchants based in Bergen began
to import dried cod fish from Iceland. This
linkage in itself was not accidental. The
first Viking settlers to Iceland came from
this part of western Norway. This trade
attracted the English merchants who,
shortly after 1400, began sailing to Iceland
in search of dry cod. Later they financed
English fishing interests to catch cod off
the coasts of Iceland and also bought it
from the local Icelandic fishermen.
The Danish crown, which ruled Iceland
at that time, frowned upon this contact.
However, Denmark lacked the necessary
naval power to block the English trade. In
fact, clashes between England and Denmark
during mid-15th century can be traced
to the killing of a Danish governor who
tried to stop both English trade with Iceland
and English fishing in Iceland’s coastal
waters. These tensions continued until the
early 16th century after which English
interests in Iceland waned with the discovery
of rich fishing grounds off the North
American coast of Newfoundland.
The French and Germans took the space
vacated by the English only to be ousted
in the early 17th century (1602) by the
Danish crown which monopolised all
Icelandic Fisheries Governance
A Third World Understanding
Today Icelandic fisheries are the most productive in the world. The country’s historic
efforts at gaining sovereignty over its fishery resources and the governance structures it has
instituted highlights the need to move from an open access regime, with possession rights
only, to a regime of explicitly recognised property rights. Recent attempts at conservation
of fishery resources through privatisation has led to dominance of foreign firms
threatening the country’s fishery sovereignty.
JOHN KURIEN
3062 Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
foreign trade by royal decree. This trade
monopoly remained for nearly 250 years
(until 1855) and could be enforced due to
the absolute monarchy enforced over
Iceland by the Danish king.
The coastal fishery in Iceland developed
significantly during the 17th and 18th
centuries. The main occupation of most of
the inhabitants was farming. But the
labourers who worked in the southern and
western regions were permitted to go fishing
in the late winter and spring when landbased
activity was at a low ebb. However,
the labourers were required to stay in the
domestic service of a farmer, and the
establishment of permanent households in
fishing stations was restricted. Thus the
landowners, in collaboration with church
functionaries and officials, monopolised
the fishing. These restrictions preempted
it from developing into an independent
industry.
This situation continued into the mid-
18th century (1784) when famine, as a
result of damage to pastures and animals
caused by a major volcanic eruption, killed
one-fifth of the population. The situation
was so bad that the Danish king even
considered the possibility of the evacuation
of the whole island. This natural
calamity, coupled with the exploits of an
adventuresome Dane who tried to capture
power in Iceland in the early 19th century,
made for a gradual weakening of the
colonial hold over Iceland. The power of
the richer farmers who employed several
farmhands declined considerably. This
gave rise to an increase of ‘unattached’
landless people. Poverty increased and
people were faced with the choice of leaving
agriculture or leaving Iceland. During this
period (1870 to 1914) over 15,000 people
migrated to Canada.
Capitalist Development
The Danish trade monopolies were rapidly
relaxed in the late 19th century and
local accumulation became possible. An
Icelandic merchant class gradually emerged
and played a significant role in investing
in the fisheries. Icelandic salted cod began
to develop new markets abroad as a result
of its quality. This was based on a method
originally developed by the Basque people.
Soon the all-important Spanish market,
which was dominated by the Norwegians,
was totally in the hands of Iceland. The
pope also helped the Lutheran Icelanders
in their fish exports. This he did inadvertently
by making salted fish the main item
on the menu during the many days that
meat was not to be consumed by Catholics
in Europe.
For the landless peasants, who remained
in Iceland, fishing gradually became an
important alternative. This gave rise to the
gradual creation of independent fishing
settlements along the coast. The petty
entrepreneur, the fishing peasant, the
skipper-owner and the merchant company
were examples of the different forms of
production that gradually emerged over
the next century. All this happened during
the struggle for Icelandic independence. It
would not be an exaggeration to say that
the gradual emergence of capitalist development
in fishery aided in the political
transformation of Iceland. The introduction
of the decked fishing vessels in the
end of the 19th century made it possible
to catch fish farther offshore than could
be done on open fishing boats. The official
declaration of a fishing limit with an
exclusive zone of three nautical miles in
1901 gave legal sanction to this process
of expansion.
Iceland got home rule in 1904. The
technological progress in fishing after that
was considerable. Motors were installed
in many of the open fishing boats and a
number of steam-driven trawlers were
acquired. Initially the large merchants
owned a substantial part of the fleet. The
productivity of fishing increased greatly,
and agriculture became relatively less
attractive as a source of subsistence to the
peasantry. All restrictions on the freedom
to move to the fishing villages were either
abolished or quietly forgotten and fishing
became a full-time occupation. The infrastructure
such as harbours, wharves and
processing facilities were set up in the
fjords by the merchants. They hired
labourers from the new coastal settlements
to work on their boats and at the processing
facilities. This provided jobs for several
hundreds during the winter months. Gradually
the number of small skipper-owners
and petty entrepreneurs increased. The
merchants who provided credit so that the
processing facilities would receive adequate
supplies of fish facilitated this.
The skipper-owners and the petty entrepreneurs
utilised their family resources of
capital and labour. As capital was scarce,
and labour availability depended on both
the sex compositions of the household and
its stage in the family development cycle,
not all skipper-owners or petty entrepreneurs
were successful. Those who had
sons of the appropriate ages could expand
their activities and gradually enlarge their
enterprise and even form a company with
family members as shareholders. Family
and private firms in the harvesting and
processing of fish became a common
organisational arrangement alongside the
peasant fishing economy. It would seem
that the control exercised by these large
family firms on the fish economy of
Iceland was considerable.
In 1911 the Fisheries Association of
Iceland was formed. This seems very much
in keeping with the country’s democratic
tradition as well as the tradition of keeping
good records. It was an organisation with
representational membership from all the
interest groups and regions of the country.
It established the tradition of calling an
annual meeting called a ‘Fiskithing’ (fisheries
congress) which became a forum to
discuss matters of concern to the fisheries.
It played a lead role in training and education
of people employed with the fisheries
and later helped in founding the
Icelandic Fisheries Laboratories and the
Marine Research Institute. The multi-stakeholder
and multi-regional character of the
Fisheries Association of Iceland gave the
industry a fair degree of openness of
operation and provided the basis for a good
form of participation by the ‘interested
public’ in the governance of the fishery.
The radical transformation of the occupational
structure and the development of
the capitalist forms of work organisation
led to the advent of both a labour movement
and a cooperative movement. This
needs to be situated against the background
of the boom in fish exports during the first
world war. In 1916 a national organisation
of trade unions was established though it
was legalised only in 1938. The merchant
owners of fishing companies had to conform
to the formal demands of labour
unions both of crew on the boats and the
workers in the processing plants.
Women came to play an important role
in the fishery. In the production process
they were involved in the making and
mending of nets and baiting of hooks.
Their role was also indispensable in the
other preparations needed to get a fishing
trip going. In the processing operations
their role was more direct and crucial, first
in the salting and drying and later in the
freezing plants. The invisible component
of women’s work – running the household
and raising the children – was also particularly
high and taxing in the homes of
fishermen who were away at sea for long
on the larger boats. Women’s franchise
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3063
rights and the early right to attend schools
of higher education provided opportunities
to move out of the conventional
roles and jobs. It also helped to foster a
nascent women’s movement in which
many from coastal communities were involved.
Unlike in many other developed
maritime countries, the organised involvement
of women in fishery is another of
the unique features of Iceland’s fish
economy. Both at the workplace and the
home, women seem to have benefited from
the rising productivity of the sector in this
time period.
The growth of labour rights, the expansion
of capitalist enterprise and the success
of fishery further fuelled the struggle for
independence. In December 1918 Iceland
became a state under the Danish crown.
Either party to the agreement could terminate
the treaty after 25 years if negotiations
about its renewal proved fruitless. Following
this, a new system of political parties
based on class divisions emerged and class
antagonism grew. The great depression
increased class tensions and the outbreak
of the Spanish civil war in 1936 closed the
important Spanish market for Icelandic
salt fish. This created a period of high
unemployment in fishery. The fishery
capitalists formed the union of Icelandic
fish producers (SIF) to gain better control
over the processing and marketing of salt
fish products. Iceland also acquired its first
coast guard vessel in 1920 since it was
highly dissatisfied with the way the Danish
navy administered the then three-mile
fishing zone, especially in the case of British
trawlers, which often fished as close to
land as they could reach.
When the second world war broke out,
the German occupation of Denmark and
the British occupation of Iceland put a cap
on the union between Iceland and the
Danish crown. Before the war, foreigners
were responsible for two-thirds of the
demersal fish catch in Icelandic waters.
The demand for Icelandic fish skyrocketed
during the war. Catches made by Icelandic
vessels increased since foreign vessels were
busy in pursuit of things other than fish.
The US took over the defence of Iceland
and stationed a force of 60,000 in a country,
which at that time had a population
of 120,000. This brought employment and
prosperity to the economy and coastal
fishery benefited greatly. In 1944 the
Icelanders decided to terminate the treaty
with Denmark and the Icelandic Republic
was formed on June 17, 1944 at Thingvellir,
the original seat of the Althing. Severing
ties with Denmark also meant taking full
charge of their fishing policies.
Independence
Independence came at the time of the
second world war. The post-war period
saw the rapid expansion of the trawler
fleet. Fish freezing became a highly technical
industry and the mainstay of Icelandic
fishery exports to Europe. There was
a phase of overexpansion, full employment,
and high inflation. The lack of a
strong political leadership marked the postwar
period. Political coalitions were the
norm in the Althing (parliament). Broadly,
they could be characterised as the ‘nationalistic’
group composed of the left-wing
parties and the ‘pro-western’ group composed
of the agrarian and the social democratic
parties. Their politics came to
flashpoints on two recurrent issues of postwar
politics: defence (on the question of
joining NATO) and fishing limits (on the
question of extending the limits of the
territorial fishing zone).
The overwhelming dependence of the
country on fisheries for its livelihood and
economic development highlighted the
need to take more proactive steps to protect
fishing grounds and ensure effective
governance over them. Following the
Truman proclamation of 1945, several Latin
American countries such as Mexico,
Argentina and Chile began claiming
national sovereignty over water covering
the continental shelf. Iceland followed
closely by enacting a law in April 1958
concerning the scientific conservation of
continental shelf fisheries. The first article
of the law reads as follows:
The ministry of fisheries shall issue regulations
establishing explicitly bounded
conservation zones within limits of the
continental shelf of Iceland, wherein all
fisheries shall be subject to Icelandic rules
and control: provided that the conservation
measures now in effect shall in no way
be reduced. The ministry shall further issue
the necessary regulations for the protection
of fishing grounds within said zones...
The regulations shall be revised in the light
of scientific research.
In May 1958, following the failure of
UNCLOS I to reach an agreement on the
extension of the fishing zone beyond the
territorial sea of 3 nautical miles, Iceland
unilaterally extended its fishing zone to 12
nautical miles in September 1958. It then
gave notice to the British trawlers still
fishing up to four miles off Iceland to
withdraw. When they did not, Icelandic
gunboats arrested two of the trawlers. In
response a British frigate and destroyer
dashed in to recapture them. This led to
the beginning of the famous ‘cod wars’.
The British Navy repeatedly sent their
gunboats to the Icelandic fishing grounds
to protect British trawlers. The Icelandic
coast guard was puny compared to the
might of the British navy. Yet they prevailed
because of their approach, in later
encounters, of perfecting the art of cutting
the trawl ropes of the British trawlers rather
than confronting their navy vessels. This
strategy paid off. British trawlers gradually
withdrew thereby increasing the stocks
under Iceland’s exclusive control.
The success of this approach resulted in
Iceland joining company with many developing
Asian countries during UNCLOS II
in 1960. Together they argued for the
concept of ‘preferential rights’ in matters
of fisheries jurisdiction in special cases of
‘overwhelming dependence’ of the coastal
state upon fisheries resources in the adjacent
sea for its livelihood and economic
development. The relevant portion of the
Icelandic proposal stated that:
Where a people is overwhelmingly dependent
upon its coastal fisheries for its livelihood
or economic development and it
becomes necessary to limit the total catch
of a stock or stocks of fish in areas adjacent
to the coastal fisheries zone, the
coastal state shall have preferential rights
under such limitations to the extent rendered
necessary by its dependence upon
the fishery.
UNCLOS II failed to reach any agreement
on extended territorial zones. This
led Iceland to further extend its fishing
zone to 50 nautical miles in 1972, and
finally to 200 nautical miles in 1976 while
UNCLOS III negotiations were still on.
This they did by amending their 1958 law
concerning the scientific conservation of
continental shelf fisheries.
Governance
The role of government in Iceland’s
fisheries can be summarised as (1) setting
the rules concerning fishing, and (2) providing
the sector with an optimal operating
environment. The ministry of fisheries is
responsible for the governance of fisheries
in Iceland and the implementation of legislation,
and issue regulation to this effect.
Its duties are general administration, longterm
planning and relations with other
fisheries institutions at the international
level. The ministry is assisted in these tasks
by three bodies: the directorate of fisher3064
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
ies, the marine research institute and the
icelandic fisheries laboratories. In 1998
the ministry of fisheries had a staff of 17
and a budget of US $ 3 million.
There are other ministries and agencies
that assist in the process of governance.
The ministry of justice administers the
Icelandic coast guard. The ministry of
communications administers the directorate
of shipping and the port and lighthouse
authority. The ministry of foreign
affairs administers the matters relating to
trade and exports as well as international
agreements.
The directorate of fisheries undertakes
the day-to-day administration of the fisheries.
It is responsible for applying legislation
on fisheries management, including
supervision of processing and handling of
fish products. It collects and publishes data
and other fisheries statistics. It authorises
fishing by issuing fishing permits to vessels.
It also issues the quotas to these
vessels and supervises the transfer of quotas
and controls the reporting of data on the
landings of vessels and monitors the
weighing-in of catches. To be able to
coordinate this for the whole country the
directorate works in collaboration with the
harbour authorities and the association of
local authorities.
The directorate provides on-board and
port supervision of vessels to inspect catch
composition, equipment used and fish
handling methods. The Icelandic coast
guard and the directorates of customs and
shipping collaborate to fulfil this mission.
The directorate issues licences to processing
plants and ensures that they keep to
the quality and hygiene standards. This is
undertaken by commissioning inspection
bodies. They in turn conduct on-board and
land-based inspection in accordance to
norms developed. The directorate approves
these inspection bodies and supervises their
operations. It also inspects processors on
an intermittent basis to verify that official
requirements are being complied with. In
1998 the directorate had a regular staff of
59 and operated on a budget of US $ 5
million of which half is covered by
licencing and other fees.
There is one important point that we
must keep in mind. The campaign for
control of territorial waters was both the
campaign of the Icelanders for priority in
exploiting the natural resources surrounding
their country, and at the same time a
campaign to achieve responsible exploitation
of the fish stocks at the level of the
individual fishing unit. Icelanders had
argued that competition among fishermen
from different nations pursuing different
goals with respect to the quantity and
quality of fish brought ashore could lead
to inefficient use of the resource. Foreigners
would be concerned about balancing
the cost and revenue for each given trip,
whereas natives would take future catches
into account in deciding what to fish and
when to do it. The mood in Iceland had
been – get rid of foreigners so that we can
manage the resource in a responsible
manner.
With the progressive extension of the
exclusive fishing zone (to 12, 50 and then
200 miles) the fishery resource therein
became the state property of Iceland.
However, coastal fishery was for all practical
purposes an open access realm for the
people of Iceland within the larger rubric
of state property. Anyone could invest in
a boat, obtain a licence and go fishing from
anywhere in the island.
This resulted in increasingly excessive
fishing capital and effort compared to the
reproductive capacity of the fish stocks.
It is estimated that between 1945 and 1983,
fisheries capital increased by well over
1,200 per cent and real catches by 300 per
cent. This long-term decline in the economic
performance of Icelandic fisheries
did not go unnoticed by the fisheries
authorities. It also probably got reflected
at the local level by increasing losses at
the level of the fishing units. The move
towards creating a consensus for change
in the property rights structure and the
nature of governance of fisheries at the
local level required a process of consensus
building at the popular level. No change
in this could be made by administrative
fiat. As it involved major wealth distribution
implications, there had to be a political
consensus on these matters. Given the
centrality of fisheries in the economy and
the democratic culture of Iceland, this was
a daunting task.
ITQs
The initial efforts to introduce mechanisms
of governance at the local level were
to apply effort limitations that focused on
limiting the number of vessels and fishing
days. This did not yield the desired results.
The situation of individuals assuming
management and self-governance responsibility
without a well-defined structure of
rights seemed to be at the root of the failure
of these efforts. To overcome this, Iceland
broke new ground in the area of fisheries
management and governance by allocating
property rights to the resources at the level
of the individual units. This can be viewed
as transference of the rights achieved by
the nation to the individual stakeholders
who had a direct interest in fishery.
These property rights took the form of
individual transferable quotas (ITQs). ITQs
are property rights to the fishery resources
that are transferable and divisible at the
discretion of the individuals, but subject
to some overall norms. The assumption
implicit in this approach is that individual
rights to property will aggregate to yield
enlightened governance of that property
by the individuals to whom the rights are
allocated.
The build-up to the decision for this
change was multi-pronged and took over
a decade. In 1975 the marine research
institute issued a report on the status of
the Icelandic cod stocks. The report, nicknamed
‘The Black Report’ pronounced
that the Icelandic cod stocks would soon
collapse if fishing was continued at the
same level of effort. Several weeks later
a working committee of the governmental
science and research council published
another report titled ‘Development of
Marine Fisheries’. This was later nicknamed
‘The Blue Report’. It merely restated
the existence of the “problem of the
commons” in marine fisheries even if all
the fishermen were of the same nationality.
This report concluded that the fishery
management methods in use at the time
were aimed at guarding the interests of
occupationally or geographically defined
groups in Iceland, but had no roots in the
biological sciences or economics. The
belief that extending national jurisdiction
would automatically lead to sustainable
fishing was therefore beginning to be
questioned. This created considerable
public opinion about the crisis in the fishery
– both its biological and economic
aspects. It was not only the scientists and
policy-makers who addressed the issues,
parliamentarians and community leaders
were involved in the process.
The Fiskithing deliberated over this
contentious issue for over a year and
finally in their annual congress in December
1983 they decided to support the
government’s moves to introduce an ITQ
system on a temporary basis for one year.
The government in power at that time (a
right wing coalition) moved cautiously.
Before the year was over the parliament
passed an amendment to the fisheries act
of 1976 giving the minister of fisheries
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000 3065
discretionary power to put a vessel quota
system in place. In the upper house of the
parliament, the amendment received only
the minimum majority necessary of 11 of
20 MPs in support. To ensure sufficient
support for the system a very important
provision was added. Vessels below 10
GRT were allowed to opt out of the catch
quota and abide by earlier effort restrictions
instead. This dual system of local
level fishery governance continued between
1984 and 1987. In January 1988 the parliament
enacted a general-vessel quota legislation
to cover all demersal fisheries and
made the effort option less attractive. In
1990 a more comprehensive legislation,
the fisheries management act, was passed.
Only vessels below 6 GRT were exempt
from the ITQ system. All vessels had to
be licensed and a moratorium was put on
issuing new licences. The ITQ system was
extended indefinitely.
The system operates in the following
manner: Every fishing vessel with a commercial
fishing permit is allocated a permanent
‘quota share’ mainly on the basis
of its catches from 1981-83. This quota
share is a percentage of the total allowable
catch (TAC) of all regulated species. The
allotted catch of each vessel therefore
changes from year to year depending on
the TAC for the species in question. The
success of the ITQ system depends
crucially on the information governance
capability of the system. Every fish landing
has to be recorded and instantly collated
to ensure that quotas are not busted.
The municipalities operate the weightstations
and they collect fees from the
vessels to cover operating costs. The information
is then put on the web page of
the directorate and in print on a monthly
basis. Catch status can be ascertained over
the phone.
Annual quotas may be sold for an individual
fishing year, but such transactions
are subject to certain limitations to prevent
sudden disruption. From 1998 onwards,
such transactions have to be transacted
only through a ‘Kvotabanki’ (quota bank).
Recent years have witnessed a rapid growth
in the sales of both permanent quota shares
and annual quotas and the quotas themselves
have attained a very big premium
in the market. From the starting position
in 1983, the ITQs have got concentrated in
the hands of a few fishing units. This process
of concentration can be viewed from
two perspectives. It can be seen as either
increasing the efficiency and stability of
the sector or as the growing marginalisation
of those whose strength in the market is
limited or non-existent. The current debate
in Iceland on the merits and demerits of
ITQs are drawn along these lines.
Questions for the Future
Who are the ultimate owners of the fishery
resource? The issue of the privatisation of
the access to the resource has become a
contentious issue in Iceland itself. The
small boat owner’s association that represents
an important segment of the fishery
from a political perspective, if nothing
else, has questioned this approach. Their
main contention is that ITQs have not led
to resource conservation. They point out
that the TACs for the important species
like cod have in fact reached their all time
low levels in the 1990s – almost a decade
after privatisation of fishing rights.
Even in the industry there is some divergence
of views on this matter. This is
particularly so in the face of trends like
greater on-board processing resulting in
loss of land-based jobs. There is also the
threat of communities losing jobs as a
result of the sale of ITQs by the firms or
individuals holding them to buyers from
other regions.
The matter has also been debated in the
supreme court of Iceland on the basis of
a case filed by an ‘ordinary citizen’ of the
country. The supreme court examined the
case by considering two constitutional
articles (Art 65 and 75) which give equal
rights for all citizens and freedom to choose
employment respectively. It also considered
Article 1 of the fisheries management
law, which makes clear that the fish resources
within the EEZ are public property.
Taking these three aspects together
the court ruled that the allocation of fishing
quotas to operative vessels according to
catch history (in 1984) was a reasonable
reaction to the resource situation at that
time. However, it ruled that converting this
to permanent rights, thus giving great,
permanent privileges to the owners of
operative vessels in 1984 cannot be justified
by any public interest and was therefore
unconstitutional. The judgment raised
the issue of who is the ultimate owner of
the fishery resources of Iceland – the public
or the ITQ holder?
Will national governance be undermined?
The most recent issue is the implication
of the foreign ownership of the
big fishery firms that hold a considerable
share of the total quota holdings. There is
considerable anxiety about the growing
concentration of the ITQs in the hands of
these few companies. The social justice
and distributional implications apart, there
is a moot question of the loss of national
control over resources. Many of the large
private companies are going public. This
action is helping them to argue that the
effective control of the companies is in the
hand of the many hundreds of shareholders
that are ordinary Icelanders. However, the
fact of the matter is that this accounts only
for a minor part of the shares. The original
owners and their subsidiary companies
still closely hold the majority shares.
Moreover, the overall quota holdings of
the 10 largest private firms increased from
25 per cent in 1991-92 to 38 per cent in
1998-99. In the context of the growing
globalisation of the fishing industry of
Iceland there is a legitimate concern that
these companies will increasingly be internationally
controlled. This can, in the long
run, give rise to a serious contradiction in
the governance and rights structures. While
the resources of the EEZ will belong to
the Icelandic republic and be governed by
national laws, the effective property rights
to the resource at the local level of the
fishing company can be very much in the
hands of foreign capital. Will national
governance be undermined from below?
Are ITQs appropriate for developing
countries? From our review of the history
we notice that Iceland had taken a lead role
in the UNCLOS to argue for the rights of
national governance of coastal waters,
particularly in cases where countries have
a greater level of dependence on fishery
for livelihood and food. This was a position
that was wholeheartedly supported by
the developing countries. Today we see
that there is a new enthusiasm on the part
of Iceland, particularly its fishery economists,
to propagate the use of private
property rights to the fishery as the sine
qua non for fisheries management to be
effective. The appropriateness of this
approach for developing countries needs
to be assessed cautiously.
In this context it is necessary to state the
assumptions behind the ITQ system and
examine if these are appropriate to the
context of developing countries. Firstly
there is the theoretical assumption that it
costs nothing to enforce the ITQ system
or at the least that the benefits will far
outweigh the costs. It is presumed that
fishery managers will be able to allot quotas
and decide the yearly TAC without interference
from the different interest groups
in the fishery – the boat owners, the pro3066
Economic and Political Weekly August 19, 2000
cessing plant owners, the local communities,
the environmentalists and other stakeholders.
Secondly, it is usually assumed
that individuals and fishing firms do not
try to cheat and harvest more than the
allotted quota. Thirdly, fishing firms are
explicitly supposed to be atomistic profitmaximisers
without any political leverage
to gain subsidisation of key inputs. It is
doubtful if these assumptions are valid
even in Iceland today and therefore
question the true efficiency of the ITQ
system in the context of real political
economy. How then is it valid for developing
countries?
Concluding Thoughts
Iceland is a unique country. As the tourist
literature announces, it is ‘Europe’s Best
Kept Secret’. The opportunity to learn about
this country, its people and its economy
are not everyday happenings. Fisheries
constitute the most important sector of the
economy and fish a central part of the diet
and culture. Iceland’s historic efforts at
gaining sovereignty over its fishery resources
have been a great source of inspiration
to developing nations in instituting
national governance structures which
played an important role in influencing the
course of the UNCLOS I, II and III discussions.
Today Iceland’s fisheries are the
most productive in the world at approximately
280 tonnes per fisherman per annum
compared to between 2 and 5 tonnes for
most developing countries. This huge
difference reflects the greater people-dominance
of the fisheries sectors of the latter
rather than the resource plenitude of the
former. The Icelandic fishery sector experience
at governance highlights the need
to move from an open access regime (with
possession rights only) to a regime of
explicitly recognised property rights.
However, property rights can take numerous
forms and the Icelandic experience of
local-level governance using private property
rights with instruments such as ITQs
may not provide a model for the third
world to follow. Subject to this caveat, the
Icelandic system of governance highlights
the potentials for making fishery the
‘engine of growth of the economy’ of a
very small nation with large fishery resources.
The ‘governance success’ of
privatisation also throws up larger issues.
The role of the ‘people of a nation’ as
stakeholders in the stewardship of
natural resources is the most important.
In the context of globalisation, and the
growing international integration of national
economies into a global system, true
national sovereignty over natural resources
can be in jeopardy. There is a need to
explicitly recognise the implications of
these factors.
[A visit to Iceland to have a first hand appreciation
of Icelandic fisheries would not have been possible
without the generous and gracious support extended
to me by the World Humanity Action Trust,
(WHAT), UK. This brief analysis and thoughts
about the governance issues in Icelandic fisheries
are based on my discussions between August 17
and 23, 1999 with numerous persons who have
a firsthand understanding of the history and state
of affairs. I would like to thank Rognvaldur
Hannesson for taking me around Iceland showing
me nature in its variety of forms – hot and cold
– and glimpses into the culture and history of the
people. This was a truly unique once-in-a-lifetime
experience. I must also place on record my sincere
gratitude to Thorolfur Matthiasson, Birgir
Runolfsson, Arthur Bogason, Orn Palsson, Jon
Thordarson, Kristjan Thorarinsson, Petur
Bjarnason, Egill Jonasson, and Gisli Palsson for
sharing with me their thoughts and writings, which
I have used liberally in this brief note. My thanks
also to Rognvaldur Hannesson and Grimur
Valdimarsson for comments on a first draft. It is
quite likely that there are errors and omissions,
the responsibility for that rests solely on my
shoulders.]
References
Bjarnason P (1999): ‘The Fisheries Association
of Iceland’ (manuscript).
Bjorgulfsdottir M (1999): ‘Scrumtious Saltfish as
a Source of Life’, Atlantica, July-August 1999,
Reykjavik.
Bogason A (1998): ‘Crossing Boundaries’
(manuscript), paper presented at Vancouver,
June.
Extavour WC (1979): ‘The Exclusive Economic
Zone: A Study of the Evolution and Progressive
Development of the International Law of the
Sea’, IUHEI, Geneva.
Fiskifelag Islands (1998): Utvegur 1997.
Hagstofa Islands (1998): Landshagir, Statistical
Yearbook of Iceland 1998, Reykjavik.
Kurien J (1998): Property Rights, Resource
Management and Governance: Crafting
an Institutional Framework for Global
Marine Fisheries, CDS/SIFFS Publications,
Trivandrum.
Matthiason T (1997): ‘Consequences of Local
Government Involvement in the Icelandic
ITQ Market’, Marine Resource Economics,
pp 107-126.
– (nd):‘The Icelandic Debate on Fishery
Management and Resource Rent Distribution’
(manuscript).
Ministry of Fisheries (1998): Close to the Sea,
Reykjavik.
National Academy of Sciences (1999): ‘The
Icelandic Individual Transferable Quota
Program’, in Sharing the Fish: Towards a
National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas,
Washington DC.
Nordal J and Kristinsson V (1996): ‘Fishing
Industry’ in Iceland, The Republic, Central
Bank of Iceland Publication, Reykjavik.
Runolfsson B (1999): ‘ ITQs in Icelandic Fisheries:
A Rights Based Approach to Fisheries
Management’, paper presented in Workshop on
Use Rights in European Fisheries, May, Brest.
The New Encyclopaedia Britannica (1994):
(15th Ed) Macropaedia, Vol 20, Iceland,
pp 760-767, Chicago.
EPW
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Activists rally to support fishermen fighting for ancestral graveyard at Karachchi, Pakistan

By Express May 28, 2010
http://tribune.com.pk/story/16746/activists-rally-to-support-fishermen-fighting-for-ancestral-graveyard/
Condemn army action against protesting fishermen.Share Printer Friendly
Email Comments KARACHI:
Human rights activists, trade unionists and advocacy groups have pledged their support for the fishing community in the city and their fight to save their graveyard.
Activists called upon the president, prime minister, army chief, chief justice and the Sindh chief minister to investigate the action taken by the police on army orders against the people of the coastal community.
Members of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Pakistan Institute for Labour Education and Research (Piler), Pakistan Trade Union Federation, Labour Party Pakistan, People’s Labour Bureau and Pakistan Fisherfolk Forum (PFF) organised a joint press conference at the Karachi Press Club on Thursday.
They alleged condemned the encroachment on the old community graveyard, located near Chashma Goth, Bin Qasim Town, by the army men from Malir Cantonment.
Members of the HRCP and trade unions called it a violation of human rights and urged the government to intervene and save the graveyard. PFF’s Muhammad Ali Shah added that the people of the community were living under pressure following the clashes on May 20 when the police resorted to aerial firing and baton charge on the protesting women and children.
The community never imagined that one day they will face such a horrible fate, when their graveyard would be encroachment on and the army and police would beat their sons and daughters, he said.
Karamat Ali of Piler said that fake cases are registered against the fishermen and their leaders just to pressure them into withdrawing their claim on the graveyard. The encroachment on the graveyard and the 300 acres near the coastal area is illegal, he said.
According to the organisers of the press conference, on October 16, 2009, when the community reached the graveyard for a funeral, military personnel took out their guns and told them to refrain from bringing their dead ones in the future. The army stopped them again from entering the graveyard on February 5 and when they repeated this on March 18, the community took the body outside the press club to protest.
Residents tried to seek the help of Pakistan People’s Party legislators, who were elected from their area, namely Sindh Minister for Jails Haji Muzaffar Shujra and MNA Sher Muhammad Baloch but they were of no help.
There are 2,300 graves in the cemetery and many have been damaged. This graveyard was used by almost 100,000 people of eight villages, including Chashma Goth, Ali Akbar Goth, Ali Brohi Goth, Ali Mohammed Khaskheli Goth, Ilyas Jat Goth, Syed Para and Baloch Para.
The PFF chairperson Muhammad Ali Shah, Qasim Khaskheli, Abubakr and other social activists held meetings with army officials to settle the dispute. The army officials claimed that they have lease documents of the 300 acres for an army training centre in the coastal areas.
The village representatives asked the army officials to show those documents so they can see how the revenue department leased out the graveyard land to the army. The army officials have yet to justify their claims.
Last week, on May 20, the army decided to build a boundary wall around this land. Their plan was, however, spoiled when the residents came to protest. The protest later turned violent as the police mistreated them.

PAKISTAN FISHERFOLK FORUM [PFF]
Sachal Hall, Jamait Market, Ibahim Hyderi,
Bin Qasim Town, Karachi, Pakistan
Tel: +92-213-5092862-5090543-5090925
Fax: 0213-5090940
E-mail: pakistanfisherfolk@hotmail.com
pakistanfisherfolk@yahoo.com
fisherfolkpk@yahoo.com
Website: www.pff.org.pk

World Forum of Fisher Peoples (WFFP) comments and objections on the Pre-Draft CRZ Notification 2010 of India

We welcome the consultative process initiated by the Ministry on the content of the proposed CRZ 2010, through issuance of a pre-draft notification, and particularly the fact that the Ministry has translated it into all coastal languages.
After going through the content of the pre-draft, however, we feel that it is contrary to the demands of fishworker groups and other civil society groups working on coastal issues, following the issuance of the draft CMZ Notification in 2008. These demands were also clearly articulated in the consultations authorized by the MoEF, organized by the CEE, over the past one year.
In our opinion the present pre-draft is ineffective both in:
(a) Strengthening the coastal regulation regime for long-term protection of coastal ecosystems
(b) Ensuring better recognition of the rights of fishing communities to their habitats
We have undertaken a detailed analysis of the pre-draft Notification to arrive at this conclusion. We, therefore, reject the pre-draft notification in totality. These are the important elements of our critique:
Weakening rather than strengthening coastal protection

The overall effect of the proposals contained in the pre-draft notification is to weaken coastal protection rather than strengthen it. These are the ways this is achieved.

1. Legitimising all previous dilutions of CRZ and adding to the pressure on coastal eco-systems

One of the foundations of the CRZ regime is the principle that only activities that require water front and foreshore facilities should be permitted. However, since 1991, this principle has been diluted with a number of amendments. The CRZ-2010 seems to have become an opportunity to provide additional exemptions and make some more activities permissible. Some of the important additions over the years that do not conform to the principle are mentioned herein below.

(i) Projects of the Department of Atomic Energy (read nuclear power plants): The concept note starts with the acknowledgement that 25% of India’s population lives within 50 kms of the coast. It is unimaginable that the Govt can permit any nuclear power plants within the 50 km zone where there is such a high population density and the consequences of any failures will be catastrophic. However, the CRZ allows nuclear power plants within the 500 m zone and even in CRZ-I areas. Such callous disregard for human safety and environment is being legitimised by CRZ-2010.
(ii) Non polluting industries in the field of Information Technology and other service industries in the CRZ of SEZs: This is clearly a ridiculous insertion which has no logic attached to it. It is applicable even to CRZ-I areas. Is pollution the only reason for restriction of activities and construction in the CRZ? Pollution is merely one tiny objection to setting up of SEZs as there are various other issues involved including the fact that SEZ does not come with the purview of the existing laws and are governed by something entirely different. Under the garb of SEZ, mega housing projects and heavy industrialisation in coastal stretches is a very strong possibility and hence there should be no scope absolutely for any SEZ within the CRZ area.
(iii) Generation of power by non-conventional energy sources in non CRZ-I areas: A blanket exemption that is difficult to accept. Why should these have to come up within the narrow 500 m coastal zone? Unless it is a wave energy or tidal energy plant and unless it is in a large mangrove area like the Sundarbans where local communities do not have access to the grid electricity?
(iv) Storage of petroleum products, fertilizers and chemicals in non CRZ-I areas: There are obviously logistical issues in storage of goods like these that get transported via sea, but the justification to store such toxic stuff in the 500 m coastal zone has never been provided.
(v) Greenfield airport in New Mumbai: The most brazen insertion in the CRZ till date is the permission for a “Greenfield airport” in Navi Mumbai and that too in mangrove area (CRZ-I). Of course, the MoEF has made this conditional to a study. Still, this highlights the dangers of not going by the cardinal principle of water front or foreshore requirement. More powerful Ministries are able to push in their agenda ignoring the needs of the coastal protection.
(vi) Exemptions to tourism projects: Tourism has been one of the more contentious issues with permission given to tourism over time to operate within the 200-500 m zone on the coast in CRZ-II and III. Despite serious objections, tourist resorts are only subject to the restriction that they are limited to “designated areas”. This is just a fig leaf as there seems to be no restriction on designating areas by concerned authorities.
(vii) Housing projects—colonizing the coast?: In the name of harmonising the provisions of the EIA notification and the CRZ, from out of the blue, come provisions for housing projects in the CRZ, with the SCZMAs having the power to grant clearances for projects up to a built up area of 20,000 sq.m and the MoEF for projects above that. Why should housing projects be allowed in the CRZ? How can such large projects be permitted within the narrow 500 m zone? For whom are these housing projects meant? Will the height limit of 9 m for dwelling of fishermen and for tourist resorts also apply to these housing projects? A provision for housing projects within the CRZ will lead to a total takeover of coastal space and the resultant displacement of fishing communities.
(viii) Regulating coastal protection measures—a silver lining: It must be acknowledged that one good regulation that makes an entry is that of regulating coastal protection measures and structures that alter the coastline. This will hopefully put an end to the racket of “sea-walls” and the growth or groynes and breakwaters constructed without any rigorous study. However, it is worth noting that the MoEF has not yet thought of provisions to rehabilitate damaged coastlines.

2. Failing to recognise and act on the fact that “permissible activities”, if not limited, can destroy the coast.

The Swaminathan Committee recognised the “cumulative impacts” that ports can have and recommended a moratorium on ports till a study is conducted. Before we discuss how the MoEF and the CRZ-2010 handles the issue of ports, it is important to recognise that cumulative impacts are there for all activities, not just ports. This has been largely ignored by CRZ 2010. It still operates on the basis of individual project clearances without fixing any limit for each type of activity or for all activities as a whole. The cumulative impacts of a few activities and how the CRZ 2010 handles these activities, are worth mentioning.

(i) Port development—shifting cultivation?: The way CRZ 2010 handles the issue of the anarchic growth of ports is surprising. Instead of following up on the idea of cumulative impact assessment and fixing limits to port development, CRZ 2010 comes up with the idea that ports can be permitted in low erosion coastlines, regulated in medium erosion coastlines and avoided in high erosion coastlines. There are a number of problems with this formulation. For one, it assumes that erosion is the only issue with ports. There are many other environmental impacts due to ports. There are also serious issues of displacement of fishing communities and negative impact on their livelihoods. Even, if we take erosion as an issue, it is important to recognise that ports and other coastal structures (including, ironically, measures taken for coastal protection) themselves contribute significantly to coastal erosion. Some of the coasts that are currently considered “high eroding” are in that state mostly due to unscientific interventions made on the coast rather than by nature itself. It is therefore ridiculous to say that ports should be allowed in “low eroding” coasts. It sounds similar to shifting cultivation in agriculture, when farmers move to new fertile lands after exhausting the fertility of old lands. Only, fallow lands—left idle for sufficient time—will regain fertility, while eroded coasts will not became stable if they are left alone.
(ii) Power plants (nuclear and thermal): With our economy becoming power hungry to maintain growth rates, power projects are being proposed in large numbers. Unfortunately, both thermal and nuclear plants are sought to be put up along the coast in large numbers. While the availability of large amount of cooling water from the sea is an attraction to both thermal and nuclear plants, the import of coal from South East Asia is an added advantage to thermal plants. The sudden increase in proposals along the coast is scary. Nagapattinam, Kutch, Sindhudurg, East Godavari, etc., are going to have a chain of thermal power projects coming up in the near future. Even if the foreshore facilities needed for power plants are a permissible activity and the plant itself is presumably outside CRZ, the enormous harm such a large number of coastal power plants and the jetties they need cannot be ignored. The large quantities of water that will be drawn on a daily basis and the heated water that will be released back to the sea all over the coast can potentially finish off coastal fishing, unless severe limits are prescribed to establishment of such units along the coast.
(iii) Tourism: When the tourist industry sought amendments to CRZ in the early 1990s, it justified concessions on the ground that only an insignificant 20 km of coastline would be needed for resorts along India’s long coastline. However, the rapid development of the tourism sector now indicates that even the entire coastline of India may not be enough for the ambitions of the tourism departments and entrepreneurs willing to invest in tourist facilities. The current stipulation of “designated areas” is weak and needs to be clearly quantified in some way to avoid a total takeover of the coast, especially in states where tourism is booming.
(iv) Desalination: This is an activity pumping in large amounts of sea water and pumping back water with low salt content. It can also cause harm to fishing, if not properly regulated and restricted.
(v) Industries: Industries of all kinds, individually or through SEZs are coming up all along the coast and even if some of them are only seeking water front or foreshore facilities in the CRZ area, they also exert a cumulative impact and not much is known about this.

Thus CRZ-2010 does not address the problem of cumulative impacts of permissible activities and given the increased demand to undertake these activities, will end up weakening coastal protection by this omission.

3. Reclassification as route for opening up more areas for “development”?

The biggest danger lurking in the CRZ-2010 is that it is a new notification and not an amendment to CRZ-91. More importantly, it involves changes in the CRZ zoning through the deletion of islands and the inclusion of aquatic areas (plus the additional area that may come in wherever the hazard line is beyond 500 m). This has given the opportunity to do a completely new classification of the coast. Instead of merely revising old CZMPs to include aquatic areas, the notification talks about fresh CZMPs to be drawn up for the entire coast. No explanation is provided in the concept note or pre-draft notification for this.

While HTL mapping across the entire coast is a welcome exercise, drawing up an entirely new CZMP will mean that there is a possibility that some of the CRZ-I areas can be re-classified as CRZ-II or III and many CRZ-III areas can be converted into CRZ-II areas. In the current CRZ regime, conversion of areas from one category to anther is not easy. It needs to go up to NCZMA for approval and approval depends on the status of that area in 1991. For instance, for conversion of CRZ-III to II, it needs to be shown that the area was already substantially built up in 1991 itself. Another example would be a mangrove area, classified as CRZ-I, but subsequently de-forested illegally. In the current regime, this cannot be reclassified as CRZ-II or III as the 1991 position would hold good. If CRZ-2010 provisions are applied, this land could very well be re-classified as CRZ-II or III. Thus the idea of new CZMPs opens the door for reclassifying areas and increased industrialisation and urbanisation of the coast.

Till now, the CZMPs prepared in 1996 on the basis of 1991 benchmarks, are the basis for deciding on whether certain activities can be permitted in a particular area or not. The 15 year-old CZMPs have become a hurdle for many ambitious projects on the coast. In some states like Gujarat this has been resolved by the CZMPs just disappearing or not being accessible to the public. The reclassification solves these problems faced by the violators! More interestingly, reclassification is being made into a virtue by providing for periodic re-classification—every five years. If CMZ attempted a wholesale opening up of the coast, CRZ-2010 will kill it in instalments.

4. Hazard line—A haphazard provision

The hazard line, a part and parcel of the discredited CMZ regime, makes a side-door entry, if not a back-door entry, into CRZ-2010. The concept note makes the masterly statement “hazard mapping mechanism to be revised” and then talks about the hazard line to be drawn up based on certain parameters with a view to provide safeguards to infrastructure and habitations of local communities. There is very little clarity on how the hazard line will work and how it will do what is supposed to do. Appendix-I to the pre-draft notification has just a sub title called “Hazard mapping” with no contents.

The pre-draft notification provisions relating to the hazard lines are terse and incomprehensible. While it is clear that in areas where the hazard line falls landward of the 500 m zone, the CRZ area will include that extra area. What is not clear is what sort of regulatory regime will apply in this case. If it is CRZ-I, will this area also become CRZ-I? If it is CRZ-II or III, what regulations will apply to this extra piece of land? In the instance where the hazard line falls seaward of the 500 m line, we get the impression that the area between the hazard line and the 500 m line will be de-regulated and only normal town and country planning rules will apply. If this reading is correct, this goes completely against the understanding of dropping CMZ and using the 500 m line as a constant for the purpose of regulation.

Given that the Ministry has publicly announced that it has World Bank funding for drawing up the Hazard line, it appears as if the Ministry is introducing the line into the CRZ to justify or legitimise its commitments to the World Bank without providing a proper justification for the line and a clear and acceptable explanation as to how it would be used. WFFP strongly rejects the inclusion of the hazard line in the CRZ.

The same game to legitimise some of the decisions of the Ministry is visible the way the National Institute for Sustainable Coastal Zone Management is deliberately woven into the text of the notification. If the Ministry has the authority to set up such an institute, why should it try to manufacture public consent for it by mentioning it without any particular reason in the notification?

5. CRZ-IV—water, water, everywhere, no regulation in sight!

The inclusion of aquatic areas in the CMZ was rejected by the NFF. However, when it was proposed to be included in the CRZ regime by the Swaminathan Committee, we agreed. This was based on the belief that the aquatic areas will receive protection from various interventions that are gradually destroying the aquatic eco-system. The health of the marine, estuarine and backwater eco-systems are very important for fishing communities.

However, CRZ 2010 is totally disappointing in the way it has handled the aquatic zone. The section on CRZ-IV, which now represents the aquatic areas, has virtually no new regulation that can be attributed to the inclusion of aquatic areas. The only regulation mentioned is that no untreated sewage, effluents or solid waste shall be let off or dumped. This is not a new provision and was already part of the old CRZ without the aquatic areas being included.

The only other provision in the CRZ-IV section is the non-regulation of fishing activities. This is a misleading provision as what the Ministry means is that fishing activities will not be regulated under CRZ but under other legal instruments like the State Marine Fishing Regulation Acts, Wildlife Protection Act, etc.

Provisions that deal with corals, sea-grass beds and breeding grounds for fish were already part of CRZ-I and hence have no particular relevance in justifying the CRZ-IV.

However, it should be noted that a general provision found in the general list of prohibited activities deals with reclamation. This means that reclamation of the aquatic areas is prohibited and this is welcome.

If the inclusion of aquatic areas in the CRZ should make any sense, then there should be some regulations to justify it. Some of the important activities that need regulation include petroleum drilling and oil & natural gas production. While there is a need for petroleum products for the development of the nation (as well as for fishing itself), it is treated as a holy cow and all the environmental damage done by the petroleum sector is ignored and fishermen are already suffering with most of the sea areas being leased out to petroleum companies. Likewise, oil spillage and pollution by ships at sea is affecting marine life. If there are other laws to regulate all this, then why create CRZ-IV?

6. Special dispensations: a hotchpotch with no discernable common logic or thread

The section dealing with special dispensations is unconvincing and opens the door for many such dispensations. It must be mentioned that that special dispensations were not recommended by the Swaminathan Committee, except for the cautious recommendation that the Ministry must carefully weigh its options for dealing with the issue of renovation of flats in Mumbai. The consultations also did not throw up any strong demand for special dispensations. Hence this is a dubious insertion that has the potential to wreck the CRZ. What is to prevent other states or cities from asking for similar dispensations and will the coalition Governments at the centre be able to resist them?

(i) CRZ-V or special dispensation?: The concept note says that Mumbai, Goa and Kerala will all come under CRZ-V. However, reading the pre-draft notification gives the impression that we are not talking of CRZ-V but a special dispensation in each of these geographical locations while retaining the current CRZ classification.
(ii) Mumbai—weak and contradictory logic: The notification mentions that Mumbai needs to be given special dispensation on account of: (i) degradation of mangroves, (ii) discharge of untreated effluents and solid wastes and (iii) need to provide decent houses to the poor section of the people. By this logic every coastal city in India should be given a special dispensation!
(iii) Only for Mumbai?: The long list of provisions made for Mumbai is mainly made of items that seem to be relevant all over India, not just Mumbai. For instance, (a) mangrove mapping and protection, (b) protection of areas of archaeological importance and heritage sites including island forts, (c) prohibition of location of disposal of conventional solid waste (is there any unconventional solid waste?), (d) measures to protect structures and habitations on the seaward side of the hazard line and (e) no dredging or mining in CRZ I area. A lot of unnecessary clauses to create an impression that the poor Mumbai is being given some concessions but a lot of additional burden at the same time!
(iv) Protecting Maharashtra Govt from contempt of court?: One of the weird formulations of the special dispensation provisions for Mumbai is the exhortation by the notification to Maharashtra Govt to implement court orders regarding mangrove mapping and protection of mangroves. Is the Maharashtra Govt in need a MoEF notification to know that it should implement court orders? Is it to protect the Maharashtra Govt from contempt of court?
(v) Roads on stilts: An interesting provision is to allow the construction of roads on stilts over mangroves in Mumbai. This appears to be an attempt to reconcile Bombay’s need for roads with the need to protect the remaining mangroves. What needs to be asked is whether construction of roads on stilts, with only negligible impact on mangroves, a real possibility? Or is it just a fiction to allay the fears of those who wish to protect mangroves? Another question: is this is meant only for Mumbai? This provision has already found its way into the exemptions given under the general section on prohibited activities within CRZ. By implication, this provision will apply across the entire coast.
(vi) Protecting builder lobbies and slum lords?: The real intention of the special dispensation to Mumbai is revealed in the set of provisions that deal with concessions for constructions by builders within the CRZ area. Though the concept note talks only about 136 slums within the CRZ areas of Greater Mumbai and Navi Mumbai, the special dispensation provided by the notification is much wider in scope. It includes (a) provision of “re-development” of “specific buildings”, and (b) slum rehabilitation schemes for slum dwellers. This needs a bit more of analysis.
(vii) Redevelopment of specific buildings: It is true that the Swaminathan Committee has recognised the problem of redevelopment of old buildings in Mumbai, but it has not actually recommended any concessions. It has only asked the Govt to carefully consider whether concessions can be given to specific buildings in specific areas. Has the Govt made any study of the specific buildings and specific areas? Has it looked into the implications of giving this concession? Has it looked into the possibility of public finance to avoid the problem of increasing the FAR/FSI in CRZ areas for redevelopment of these “specific buildings” as suggested by the Swaminathan Committee? Unless it provides adequate information to justify this concession, is it not creating the wrong impression that it is acting on the Swaminathan Committee recommendations?
(viii) Slum rehabilitation—an end to the koliwadas?: The proposal to undertake slum rehabilitation has not been recommended by the Swaminathan Committee. In fact the Committee has quoted at length objections from the fishing community regarding such a move. Has the Ministry conducted any study to check whether the fishing community fears are justified? Is this provision meant for any specific slums or is this a provision for ever? What does “local regulations” mean for slum development in terms of FAR and FSI? Slums within CRZ are deliberate creations of slum lords who are linked to builders and who in turn are well networked with powerful politicians. This concession will lead to handing over of the high value Bombay coast to builders and end in the further marginalisation of the fishing communities and the destruction of the original settlements of Mumbai—the Koliwadas.
(ix) Townships in the CRZ?: The special provisions to Mumbai also mention that construction and township projects above 20,000 sq.m will need MoEF clearance while smaller projects can be cleared by local authorities. Why this provision? Does this mean that in addition to the “specific buildings” and “slum clearance” projects, there will be other housing projects within the CRZ in Mumbai?
(x) Kerala—special dispensation for backwater islands or the entire coast?: Both the concept note and the notification create an impression that Kerala is being given special concessions in the case of “backwater islands”. However, this does not seem to be case and the entire Kerala coast is getting a special dispensation. One concession to Kerala is to allow construction of dwelling units of “local communities” beyond 50 m with the permission of Panchayats. In the case of the “backwater islands”, the CRZ is being reduced from 500 m to 50 m. The concession to all local communities to build in the 50-200 m zone is to invite problems for the fishing communities who are precariously placed on the coast and competing with various interests for coastal space. Anyone in Kerala who buys land on the coast will automatically become part of the local community and get Panchayat permission for construction. The entire Kerala coast will virtually become a CMZ-II with a completely built up area.
(xi) Goa: The special dispensation for Goa is simple—reconstruction and repairs of all local community dwellings in Goa are allowed within the CRZ area. This is however padded by a number of redundant provisions. Here, like in Kerala, the objection is that fishing communities who need to be on the coast are clubbed with the rest under the generic term “local communities”.
(xii) Goa—Khazan lands to be protected or “managed”?: While the idea of bringing Khazan lands in Goa under the regime to protect their use for paddy cultivation, the idea of preparing “management” plans sounds fishy. Khazan lands needs to protected for the environment service they provide in protecting the ground water from becoming saline.
(xiii) Biospheres, ecologically important areas or CVCAs?: The concept note explains that bio-sphere areas that have a sizeable population have special problems and a special dispensation needs to be given to them. However, the notification itself does not talk about biospheres but about a new category called “ecologically important areas”. This seems to be a new term distinct from eco-sensitive areas that have been listed in the CRZ-I. Further, it goes to say that these ecologically important areas will be declared as Critically Vulnerable Coastal Areas! Are biospheres being renamed CVCAs for being ecologically important?
(xiv) What is common to the CVCAs?: The list of locations is somewhat difficult to interpret from the point of view of commonality. If one goes by the concept note, the intention is to provide some relief to people trapped in biospheres that are CRZ-I areas. However, with the exception of Sundarbans, it is not clear that any of the other areas listed have people struggling due to CRZ norms, more than people in other parts of the coast. Perhaps, Coringa in E.Godavari has similarities to Sundarbans on account of a mangrove estuarine system that covers over 200 sq.km. In the rest of the areas listed, the issue seems to be more of industries, ports, SEZs and other infrastructure projects that are destroying the biosphere. The Gulf of Kutch marine national park, the first of its kind in India is being destroyed by ports and petroleum pipe lines.
(xv) Who will benefit from CVCAs and management plans?: If integrated management plans need to be made for CVCAs, what exactly are the implications? Has the Ministry studied the specific problems in each of the areas listed? Will the CRZ regulations be held in abeyance and everything will depend on the plans, as was visualised in CMZ and now in the IPZ? If so, it will only be the industries that benefit and not local communities
(xvi) What about other laws?: The biospheres, national parks, sanctuaries, etc. are all constituted under other laws. Will the CRZ notification prevail in case of conflicts?

The entire special dispensation regime proposed in CRZ-2010 smacks of weak analysis/rationale, mixing up of issues, confused objectives, obfuscation of real motives, and completely arbitrary solutions. It is better to dispense with the special dispensations and deal with problems that need to be solved with appropriate rules that will stand rigorous interrogation.

6. Abandoning the islands

The CRZ for island territories is being dispensed with and replaced with IPZ. The NFF has already objected to the IPZ notification as it dispenses with coastal regulation and replaces it with “management”. It is important to mention this while discussing CRZ-2010. NFF strongly objects to the island territories being taken out of the CRZ regime.

7. CRZ Implementation—new provisions, but…..

An effort has been made in CRZ-2010 to improve the implementation of the CRZ. These include the following provisions: (i) streamlining procedure for grant of clearances, (ii) provisions for transparency with regard to applications, clearances, compliance reports, violations, etc, (iii) empowering the SCZMAs and NCZMA with powers under the EPA to take action against violators of CRZ, (iv) a time bound plan by States and UTs to deal with pollution of coastal areas and waters with adequate budget and (v) asking SCZMAs to identify all violations within three months and to take action within six months.

However, serious doubts persist about the ability of the Ministry to enforce many of these provisions, even if one grants that it is serious about enforcement. These are the concerns:

(i) Practicality of deadlines and proposed action: State Govts and local bodies are very much part of violations including the dumping of untreated sewage. Does MoEF have the clout to bring them to book? Is it possible to get states to actually clean up the effluents within a period of two years as mentioned? Did not the CRZ-91 also say something similar and fail miserably? Is it humanly possible to identify all violations within 3 months? What sort of action can one expect—mere notices or actual demolitions, fines, etc.?
(ii) Composition of SCZMAs and NCZMAs: The SCZMAs and the NCZMA are packed with bureaucrats and persons obliged to Govt in many ways. Very few of them even know the ground realities and have no options but to go by what is provided through official channels. Very rarely are there voices of dissent and they are quickly silenced due to lack of support. The composition of these bodies need to strengthened with stronger grass roots representatives and fishing community leaders committed to environment and livelihood protection. More civil society voices should be part of these set-ups.
(iii) Functioning of SCZMAs and NCZMA: The Ministry must get a proper study done on the functioning of these bodies and the reasons for their failures and to develop a package of measures to rectify them. Without that all quick-fixes will not work.
(iv) Ignoring special status of fishing villages and gaunthans: One of the dangers of the exercise to book violations will be that technically many of the dwelling units in fishing villages and gaunthans may also be in violation of CRZ, if strictly applied. Unless the exemption to them is clearly specified, local authorities will deliberately target them as a means to sabotage the entire process of booking violations.


CRZ-2010—Failing the Fishing Community

The second rationale for changes to CRZ-91 was the understanding the needs of the fishing communities are not taken care of adequately and there is a need to ensure that this happened. Looking at the provisions of CRZ-2010, one can only say that it has failed on this count also.

The CRZ-2010 provides the following specific provisions for fishing communities: (i) permission to double the number of dwellings in the 200-500 m zone of CRZ-III with 2010 as the cut-off year, and (ii) a list of facilities/activities related to fishing that are permitted in the 0-200 m of CRZ-III.


Ignoring rights, providing limited concessions

The CRZ-2010 is still in the business of providing some concessions to fishing communities rather than acknowledge their rights. This despite the fact that the Ministry has already accepted that the rights of fishing communities to coastal areas needs to be recognized, as also recommended in Final Frontier. In this context the CRZ should at least do what is within the Ministry’s purview vis-à-vis rights. NFF has clearly sought provisions in CRZ authorising fishing hamlet sabhas to take decisions on dwelling units and livelihood facilities subject to certain constraints or limits. Instead, CRZ-2010 has consigned fishing communities to a 200-500 m zone ghetto in CRZ-III.

The activities permitted in the 0-200 m zone of CRZ-III areas is not complete, but NFF sees no point in negotiating the list at the moment as it is based on the attitude of providing concessions, not rights.

Eliminating fishermen from CRZ-I and II

Going by the provisions of CRZ-I and II, fishermen have no real place in them. In CRZ-I in the name of ecology, fishermen have no rights while environmentally risky activities are allowed under the logic that they need water front or foreshore facilities. In CRZ-II, the fishermen are treated on par with all other occupants of the coast. This would automatically lead to their gradual elimination by as the rich buy out the poor fishermen lands or make use of their lack of formal title deeds. Unless the MoEF recognises that the fishing community needs the water front and foreshore facilities and have historic rights in this regard, the CRZ provisions will always fall short of doing justice to fishing communities.

Increasing opportunities for others on the coast and squeezing fishermen out

What the CMZ proposed to do, the CRZ-2010 does more gently and in stages. The increasing demand for use of coast by different “permitted” and “exempted” activities will lead to increased pressure on coastal lands and resources. Violations add to the pressure. With CRZ-2010 showing no signs of trying to limit growth of activities on the coast or look at cumulative impacts, the fishing community will face both physical displacement and livelihood losses.

Special dispensations—adverse to fishing communities

The special dispensations given in Mumbai, Goa and Kerala are in general adverse to fishermen as they promote the claims of others who are competing with fishing communities for coastal space and resources. Using euphemisms like “local communities”, the non-fishing community interests are being promoted and the fishing community, by virtue of its social, economic and political marginalisation will be the biggest loser in areas of “special dispensation”. It was the fishing communities which needed a special dispensation in CRZ-2010, not the others.

Does CRZ-2010 get a pass mark?

The CRZ-2010 pre-draft notification fails to satisfy the two criteria used by NFF to judge it: (i) increased coastal protection and (ii) protecting the rights and interests of the fishing communities.

The CRZ-2010 fails to deliver on its mandate basically because many of its provisions actually come from outside the two legitimate sources it needed to depend upon: (i) Final Frontier and (ii) the consultations organised by CEE.

While NFF is not in full agreement with all the recommendations of the Final Frontier, its broad approach is sound. Likewise, the consultations brought out a diversity of views and there was no scope of building a consensus or assessing the actual support that many views had. However, there were many views that had clearly support across the coast and the Ministry has clearly ignored them. One clear example is that there was a universal stand across the coast to go back to the original 1991 notification as base document. The list of views that came across clearly and were ignored by the Ministry is a long one.

Hence NFF rejects the CRZ-2010 pre-draft notification in its current form.

WHAT THE WFFP SEEKS

The WFFP is willing to accept changes to CRZ as long as the formulation satisfies the following conditions

• Re-establishing the primacy of water front and foreshore requirements as principle for permitting activities on the coast; strict adherence to the principle
• Recognising that activities that require water front and foreshore facilities cannot be allowed without setting limits. MoEF must undertake a comprehensive study of the coast and the cumulative impacts (both environmental and social) of various activities, and fix limits that will allow the coast to exist as a healthy eco-system providing sustainable benefits to many
• Recognise the right of the coastal fishing communities to the coastal zone (not just a small part of it) and give them the responsibility to plan and use the coastal space in a sustainable manner; protect fishing villages from encroachments by industries, SEZs, power plants, ports, etc.
• Drop the proposal to include aquatic areas unless there is a will to develop a comprehensive system of regulation to protect the marine and brackish-water eco-system, taking on the some of the holy cows of modern India like oil exploration and production.
• Drop the hazard line as there is no clear understanding how it will be used and the fishing communities are unwilling to accept it
• Realise that the fishing communities represent the single biggest constituency for coastal protection in India and is the best ally for the MoEF, if it genuinely seeks coastal protection; involve fishing community and its organisations in monitoring and provide proper representation in all bodies dealing with coastal regulations; strengthen presence of environmentalists and livelihood experts in such bodies
• Strengthen EPA provisions for deterrent punishments that will include fines in proportion to the ecological destruction caused and include imprisonment of violators
• The notification is only a stop gap arrangement accepted by WFFP till the time the Ministry comes out with a legislation to regulate the coastal zones.

Thomas Kocherry
Special Invitee
27-05-2010

Oceans' fish could disappear in 40 years: UN

By Sebastian Smith (AFP)
NEW YORK — The world faces the nightmare possibility of fishless oceans by 2050 unless fishing fleets are slashed and stocks allowed to recover, UN experts warned Monday.
"If the various estimates we have received... come true, then we are in the situation where 40 years down the line we, effectively, are out of fish," Pavan Sukhdev, head of the UN Environment Program's green economy initiative, told journalists in New York.
A Green Economy report due later this year by UNEP and outside experts argues this disaster can be avoided if subsidies to fishing fleets are slashed and fish are given protected zones -- ultimately resulting in a thriving industry.
The report, which was opened to preview Monday, also assesses how surging global demand in other key areas including energy and fresh water can be met while preventing ecological destruction around the planet.
UNEP director Achim Steiner said the world was "drawing down to the very capital" on which it relies.
However, "our institutions, our governments are perfectly capable of changing course, as we have seen with the extraordinary uptake of interest. Around, I think it is almost 30 countries now have engaged with us directly, and there are many others revising the policies on the green economy," he said.
Environmental experts are mindful of the failure this March to push through a worldwide ban on trade in bluefin tuna, one of the many species said to be headed for extinction.
Powerful lobbying from Japan and other tuna-consuming countries defeated the proposal at the CITES conference on endangered species in Doha.
But UNEP's warning Monday was that tuna only symbolizes a much vaster catastrophe, threatening economic, as well as environmental upheaval.
One billion people, mostly from poorer countries, rely on fish as their main animal protein source, according to the UN.
The Green Economy report estimates there are 35 million people fishing around the world on 20 million boats. About 170 million jobs depend directly or indirectly on the sector, bringing the total web of people financially linked to 520 million.
According to the UN, 30 percent of fish stocks have already collapsed, meaning they yield less than 10 percent of their former potential, while virtually all fisheries risk running out of commercially viable catches by 2050.
Currently only a quarter of fish stocks -- mostly the cheaper, less desirable species -- are considered to be in healthy numbers.
The main scourge, the UNEP report says, are government subsidies encouraging ever bigger fishing fleets chasing ever fewer fish, with little attempt made to allow the fish populations to recover.
The annual 27 billion dollars in government subsidies to fishing, mostly in rich countries, is "perverse," Sukhdev said, since the entire value of fish caught is only 85 billion dollars.
As a result, fishing fleet capacity is "50 to 60 percent" higher than it should be, Sukhdev said.
Creating marine preservation areas to allow female fish to grow to full size, thereby hugely increasing their fertility, is one vital solution, the report says.
Another is restructuring the fishing fleets to favor smaller boats that -- once fish stocks recover -- would be able to land bigger catches.
"What is scarce here is fish," Sukhdev said, "not the stock of fishing capacity."
Copyright © 2010 AFP. All rights reserved. More »
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